Abstract. Group key exchange (GKE) protocols can be used to guarantee confidentiality and group authentication in a variety of group applications. The notion of provable security subsumes the existence of an abstract formalization (security model) that considers the environment of the protocol and identifies its security goals. The first security model for GKE protocols was proposed by Bresson, Chevassut, Pointcheval, and Quisquater in 2001, and has been subsequently applied in many security proofs. Their definitions of AKE-and MA-security became meanwhile standard. In this paper we analyze the BCPQ model and some of its later appeared modifications and identify several security risks resulting from the technical construction of this model -the notion of partnering. Consequently, we propose a revised model with extended definitions for AKE-and MA-security capturing, in addition, attacks of malicious protocol participants. Further, we analyze some well-known generic solutions (compilers) for AKE-and MA-security of GKE protocols proposed based on the definitions of the BCPQ model and its variants and identify several limitations resulting from the underlying assumptions. In order to remove these limitations and at the same time to show that our revised security model is in fact practical enough for the construction of reductionist security proofs we describe a modified compiler which provides AKE-and MA-security for any GKE protocol, under standard cryptographic assumptions.
MODULARITY OF PROTOCOL DESIGN. Since GKE protocols are used as building blocks for high-level applications, it is interesting to design them in a modular way: applications that make use of these protocols may have specific security goals, and thus it is desirable that a specific GKE protocol can provide the corresponding properties. Modular design allows to build such "à la carte" protocols. In order to provide these modular constructions in a generic way, so-called "compilers" have been developed, e.g., [32, 33] . They allow designers to enhance security of a protocol in a black-box manner, that is, independently of the implementation of the protocol being enhanced. In general, security enhancement means enlarging the class of adversaries the protocol can deal with, or adding new security properties.
CONTRIBUTIONS AND ORGANIZATION. We start with the brief overview of the BCPQ model and its security definitions. In Section 3 we point out a problem in the BCPQ model between its technical core -the notion of partnering -and its definition of MA-security. In Section 4 we analyze some well-known variants of the BCPQ model, i.e., [27, 32, 33] , from the perspective of general applicability (independence of protocol design), technical construction of partnering, and MA-security whereby focusing on possible attacks carried out by malicious participants. By malicious participants we mean legitimate protocol participants who are fully controlled by the adversary. We emphasize that consideration of malicious participants makes sense in the scope of MA-security but not of AKE-security that deals with the secrecy of the group key since malicious participants learn the established group key anyway.
After identifying some drawbacks in the mentioned variants we describe in Section 5 an extended "game-based" security model with revised definitions of AKE-and MA-security under consideration of malicious participants. Our model is based on the more powerful BCPQ refinement from [13] that considers AKE-security in the presence of (partial) internal state corruptions (strong corruptions). We also introduce an additional notion of backward secrecy which leads to new corruption models in case of AKE-security.
In Section 7.2 we provide a brief analysis of some known security-enhancing compilers for GKE protocols. In particular, we show that the compiler proposed by Katz and Yung in [33] needs some additional assumptions in order to be considered as a really generic solution. On the other hand, in order to show that our extended security definitions are feasible enough for the construction of practical reductionist security proofs, in Section 7.3 we describe a compiler C-AMA (as a slightly modified combination of the compilers from [33] and [32] ) that satisfies our stronger definitions of AKE-and MA-security for any GKE protocol and prove its security under standard cryptographic assumptions.
Overview of the BCPQ Model
The BCPQ model extends the methodology introduced by Bellare and Rogaway [8, 9] to a group setting. Each protocol participant U i ∈ ID 3 , i = 1, . . . , n is modeled by an unlimited number of instances called oracles and denoted Π si i (s i -th instance of U i ) that can be involved in different concurrent executions of P. Each user U i is assumed to have a long-lived key LL i (either symmetric or asymmetric). The BCPQ model uses session ids to define the notion of partnering which is the technical construction used in the definition of all security goals. A session id of an oracle Π l ∀ l ∈ {1, n} \ {i}}. 3 ID is a set of n participants involved in the current protocol execution and is part of a larger set that contains all possible participants.
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The BCPQ model considers a Probabilistic Polynomial-Time (PPT) adversary A which while executed is allowed to send messages to the oracles (and invoke the protocol execution) via a Send query, reveal the session key computed by an oracle via a Reveal query, obtain a long-lived key of a user via a Corrupt query (note that the oracle's internal state information is not revealed), and ask a Test query to obtain either a session key or a random number. Using this adversarial setting the BCPQ model specifies two security goals for a GKE protocol: AKE-security and MA-security, both based on the notion of partnering. We emphasize that the above definition of partnering has been further used in the BCPQ variants proposed in [12] [13] [14] and these models in turn have been used in security proofs of GKE protocols in [12] [13] [14] [15] .
For the AKE-security the model requires that, during its execution, adversary A asks a single Test query to a fresh oracle. An oracle Π si i is fresh if (1) it has accepted, (2) no oracle has been asked for a Corrupt query before Π si i accepts, and (3) neither Π si i nor any of its partners have been asked for a Reveal query. A GKE protocol is said to be AKE-secure if A cannot guess which value it has received in response to its Test query, i.e., the session key or a random number, significantly better than at random. This definition of AKE-security, applied with an appropriate definition of freshness, subsumes the following earlier informal definitions:
-key secrecy [24] (a.k.a implicit key authentication [39] ) which requires that each legitimate protocol participant is assured that no other party except for other legitimate participants learns the established group key; -resistance against known-key attacks [17, 48] meaning that an adversary who knows group keys of previous sessions must not be able to compute subsequent session keys, key independence [35] meaning that an adversary who knows a proper subset of group keys must not be able to discover any other group keys; -perfect forward secrecy [24, 30, 39] requiring that the disclosure of long-term keying material must not compromise the secrecy of the established keys from earlier protocol runs.
The definition of MA-security in the BCPQ model captures the fact that it is hard for a computationally bounded adversary A to impersonate any participant U i through its oracle Π si i . For a GKE protocol among n users to be MA-secure, the probability that there exists at least one oracle Π si i which accepts with |PIDS(Π si i )| = n − 1 is required to be negligible. In other words, for such protocols, the authors claim that if each participating oracle Π si i accepts with |PIDS(Π si i )| = n − 1 then no impersonation attacks could have occurred -thus the informal notion of mutual authentication [8] 4 meaning that each participating oracle is assured of every other oracle's participation in the protocol is satisfied.
Further, we point the reader's attention to the following claims given by the authors of [15] :
In the definition of partnering, we do not require that the session key computed by partnered oracles be the same since it can easily be proven that the probability that partnered oracles come up with different session keys is negligible. [15, Footnote 3] We are not concerned with partnered oracles coming up with different session keys, since our definition of partnering implies the oracles have exchanged exactly the same flows. [15, Section 7.4] If these claims hold then the above definition of MA-security additionally captures the following informal security goals earlier specified in the literature:
-key confirmation meaning that each protocol participant must be assured that all other protocol participant that have accepted hold identical group keys 5 , -explicit key authentication [39] , i.e., key confirmation and mutual authentication at the same time.
In Section 3 we explain why the definition of MA-security might not be general enough for GKE protocols. We do not pretend having broken some provably MA-secure scheme. In contrast, we explain why, if every participating oracle Π si i accepts with |PIDS(Π si i )| = n − 1, it does not necessarily mean that the considered protocol provides mutual authentication and key confirmation. To do so, we exhibit cases where an impersonation attack may likely result in different group keys accepted by different partnered oracles. Note that these problems become visible only in the group setting with at least three protocol participants: therefore, it does not concern the original notion of mutual authentication by Bellare and Rogaway [7] defined via matching conversations. Before we give examples using a concrete GKE protocol we provide an abstract description of our idea. Figure 1 shows the abstract messages denoted m i (index i specifies the order in which messages have been sent) that have been exchanged between the oracles (at least three participants are required) during the honest execution of any GKE protocol from [12] [13] [14] [15] . A concrete equivalent message of each abstract message m i can be found in the corresponding up-or downflow stage of any of these GKE protocols.
m1 m2 m2 m3 m3 m3 Fig. 1 . Honest execution of protocols in [12] [13] [14] [15] . By m i at the beginning of the arrow we mean the original message sent by the oracle, and by m i at the end of the arrow we mean the corresponding message received by another oracle. Obviously, Figure 1 shows a correct execution of the protocol since no message is modified. Figure 3 specifies the session ids of the oracles Π s1 1 , . . . , Π s3 3 during this honest protocol execution using the construction from the BCPQ model.
SID(Π
To show the first problem we consider the case where A impersonates U 1 and modifies message m 1 tom 1 (Figure 2 ) such that SID 21 =m 1 (Figure 4 ). We cannot generally assume that all oracles accept after this modification but we may assume that there exists protocols for which this is the case (our example later is such a protocol where the oracles nevertheless accept). If so, we show that every participating oracle Π CONCRETE EXAMPLE. Consider the GKE protocol described in the same paper as the BCPQ model [15] but without the additional confirmation round; this additional round belongs to a concrete protocol design but not to a general security model; it is not required that a protocol uses this additional round to achieves MA-security.
Recall, our goal is to show that despite of the acceptance of each oracle Π = 1 its verification; g is a generator of a cyclic group of prime order p. Upon computing K = g x1x2x3 each oracle derives the resulting group key k := H(ID, F L 3 , K) with a random oracle H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l where l is the security parameter. Now we consider that Π
Fig . 5 . Execution of the protocol in [15] with three participants and replays a corresponding message from some previous protocol execution. The replayed message is likely to be
2 can still verify the replayed message, i.e., V ( F l 1 ) = 1 holds. It is easy to see that
2 and Π s3 3 compute another value, i.e., K = g f x1x2x3 . Thus the derived group keys are different. Though (without the confirmation round) all oracles accept since all signature verifications remain correct. Moreover, and similarly to the abstract problem description above, it is easy to check that |PIDS(Π si i )| = 2 for every Π si i , i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. This illustrates the case where |PIDS(Π si i )| = 2 and yet the protocol does not provide mutual authentication and key confirmation. We stress, again, that this does not contradict the MA-security of the proposed protocol when the additional round is executed. However, there may exist other protocols (including our example) for which this statement is not true (if the MA-security is tentatively achieved with other techniques), and thus it is worth studying the generality/applicability of MA-security definition in the BCPQ model. Furthermore, we stress that the more general definition of MA-security should also consider attacks by malicious protocol participants (the BCPQ model had no intention to consider such scenario). For example, as noted in [22] many BCPQ-like models fail to provide security against unknown key-share attacks [10] because they do not consider malicious (corrupted) participants during the protocol execution. It is interesting to notice that, while malicious participants surely break the AKE-security (session key indistinguishability), their actions against MAsecurity left some open questions: though the work by Katz and Shin [32] provides a partial solution, it is worth noticing that protection (i.e., resilience) has no satisfying solution yet. It is a subject of future work to be able to detect and eliminate the dishonest players in such a way that the remaining, honest ones, can compute a common key. consists of the identities of all group members who intend to participate in the protocol and is defined straight after the invocation of the protocol execution. Hence, opposite to the BCPQ model, this set is known before the protocol completes. Further, the session id of Π si i is simply the concatenation of all messages that Π si i has sent or received during the protocol execution. Note that the KY model was proposed in the context of a GKE protocol over an unreliable asynchronous broadcast channel. Obviously, in this case every oracle computes the same session id. However, the KY model fails in protocols where some messages are sent over unicast, e.g., in protocols from [12] [13] [14] [15] . Note, however, that any construction of session ids based on the concatenation of exchanged message flows has one significant drawback -it becomes available after the protocol termination only. Since some protocols use uniqueness of session ids as protection against replay and protocol interference attacks it is desirable to have a unique session id prior to the protocol termination. The partnering between two oracles holds if they have equal partner ids and equal session ids. Note that the KY model does not provide own definition of MA-security but refers to the one in the BCPQ model. Due to the different construction of partnering the identified problems in the BCPQ model have no consequences here.
Finally, another limitation of the KY model is that it is not intended for considering malicious participants.
A VARIANT BY DUTTA et al. The modification by Dutta et al. [27] is similar to the KY model regarding the construction of partner ids. However, they define a session id of an oracle Π si i as {(U 1 , s 1 ), . . . , (U n , s n )} where each pair (U j , s j ), j ∈ {1, . . . , n} corresponds to the oracle Π sj j of the protocol participant U j , and say that two oracles are partnered if they have equal partner ids and equal session ids. In order to keep session ids unique the authors require the uniqueness of oracles for each new session. To have this notion made sense, [25] suggests to use a counter value as an additional parameter which should be increased for every new oracle of the user. Though this makes unique session ids available prior to the protocol termination, it forces the counter to be saved after each execution and protected against modifications. A more practical approach seems to be using nonces in each new protocol execution (excluding the highly improbable case of collisions). Note also that [27] and [25] had no intentions to consider mutual authentication and key confirmation.
A VARIANT BY KATZ AND SHIN. Katz and Shin [32] proposed a different security model (referred to as the KS model) for GKE protocols, and provide a security analysis in the framework of Universal Composability (UC) [20] . The KS model provides the first formal treatment of GKE protocols security in the presence of malicious participants. The KS model is an extension of the BCPQ and KY models. The partner ids and the partnering relationship between the oracles is similar to the KY model but unique session ids are assumed to be provided by some high-level application mechanism.
Among other things, the KS model defines security against insider attacks as a combination of two requirements: agreement and security against insider impersonation attacks:
-the adversary A is said to violate agreement if there exist two partnered oracles Π . In other words, the instance Π s i computes the session key and U i believes that U j does so, but in fact an adversary has participated in the protocol on behalf of U j ; a protocol is said to be secure against insider impersonation attacks if for any party U j and any instance Π Obviously, the last requirement assumes the existence of at least two uncorrupted participants, but allows the adversary to corrupt other participants: an active adversary can thus generate fresh messages on behalf of other On Security Models and Compilers for Group Key Exchange Protocols 7 participants. Intuitively, security against insider impersonation attacks considers mutual authentication and unknown key-share resilience in the presence of malicious participants. Note that the KS model does not describe what relationship do their formal definitions have with the well-known informal definitions. Their security analysis holds in the framework of UC-security, based on the simulatability approach [19] rather than on a reductionist approach [6, 37] .
Further, in addition to their model, Katz and Shin proposed a compiler to turn any GKE protocol which is secure in the BCPQ model into a protocol which is secure in their UC-based model, and provided simulatabilitybased security proofs for this case. However, they left open the question whether their definitions of agreement and security against insider impersonation attacks are practical enough for the construction of reductionist security proofs (even though UC-security is considered to be stronger).
The Revised "Game-based" Security Model
In the following we propose a new variant of the BCPQ model while considering malicious participants. We provide an alternative definition (which we call MA-security to keep consistency with all previous models) that can be used to replace definitions of agreement and security against insider impersonation attacks of the KS model. One advantage is that, for the same requirements, our model needs only one definition (and consequently one reductionist proof) whereas in the KS model two definitions are needed. Furthermore, we prove that our definition really unifies the informal notions of key confirmation, mutual authentication and unknown key-share resilience in the presence of malicious participants while the KS model does not explicitly prove this.
Our variant is based on the refined BCPQ model as presented in [13] , a refinement that considers strong corruptions, i.e., attacks against internal states. We also extend the original definition of AKE-security (in a modular way) considering a new requirement which we call backward secrecy.
Protocol Participants, Variables
USERS, INSTANCE ORACLES. We consider U as a set of N users in the universe. Each user U i ∈ U holds a long-lived key LL i . In order to handle participation of U i in distinct concurrent protocol executions we consider that U i has an unlimited number of instances called oracles; Π 
κ . Every session is identified by a unique session id sid s U . This value is known to all oracles participating in the same session. Similarly, each oracle Π s U ∈ G gets a value pid s U that contains the identities of participating users (including U ), or formally
We say that two oracles, Π U it accepts and terminates the execution of the protocol operation (possibly after some additional auxiliary steps), meaning that it would not send or receive further messages. If the protocol execution fails (due to any adversarial actions) then Π s U terminates without having accepted, i.e., the session group key k s U is set to some undefined value.
Definition of a Group Key Exchange Protocol
Definition 1 (GKE Protocol). A group key exchange protocol P consists of a key generation algorithm KeyGen, and a protocol Setup defined as follows:
On input a security parameter 1 κ each user in U is provided with a long-lived key LL U .
P.Setup(S):
On input a set S of n unused oracles a new group G is created and set to be S, then a probabilistic interactive protocol is executed between oracles in G.
We call P.Setup an operation. We say that a protocol is correct if all oracles in G accept with the same session group key k. We assume it is the case for all protocols in this paper. A passive adversary can eavesdrop the execution of the protocol operations via Setup queries, reveal session group keys, internal states and corrupt participants via RevealKey, RevealState, and Corrupt queries, respectively, and is also allowed to ask Test queries. Additionally, it is given access to the Send queries, however, with the restriction that it is not allowed to inject, replay, or modify messages. Thus, a passive adversary can truly forward, drop, and delay messages, or deliver them out of order. Although Setup queries can be simulated using Send with the appropriate invocation messages, the presence of these queries still allows a separate treatment of the (weaker) passive adversaries who are restricted to the eavesdropping of the protocol execution in the sense of [33] . Note that in our model the passive adversary is stronger than in [33] and is comparable to the one from [21] . 9 FORWARD SECRECY. The notion of forward secrecy allows to distinguish between damages (in previously completed sessions) that result from actions of the adversary in the current session. Similar to [13] we distinguish between weak-forward secrecy (wfs) where the adversary is additionally allowed to ask Corrupt queries, and strong-forward secrecy (sfs) where it is additionally allowed to ask Corrupt and RevealState queries.
Adversarial Model
BACKWARD SECRECY. The notion of backward secrecy is symmetric to that of forward secrecy in the sense that it considers damages to the AKE-security of future sessions after actions of the adversary in past/current sessions. The notion might seem useless at first glance (such actions can make secrecy just impossible), however, there might exist intermediate actions, such as corruptions of internal states, that do not compromise future session keys (or at least not all of them). We distinguish between weak-backward secrecy (wbs) where the adversary is allowed to ask RevealState queries, and strong-backward secrecy (sbs) where the adversary is additionally allowed to ask Corrupt queries 7 . Note that in our definition of AKE-security that models key secrecy, the adversary is a non-participating party and not a malicious participant, even in case that it reveals long-lived keys prior to the protocol execution. In order to consider only non-participating adversaries we introduce the following notion of α-fresh sessions. We say that a session is α-fresh if all participating oracles are α-fresh.
The above definition is given from the perspective of an oracle which participates in a concrete operation execution of P. Note that in our model a new group G is created for every invoked operation, i.e., new session. In the following we provide some additional explanations concerning our definition of α-freshness.
Obviously, the wfs-freshness allows Corrupt queries to any user in U after the oracles in G have accepted whereas the sfs-freshness allows, additionally, RevealState queries to any oracle of any user in U after the oracles in G have accepted. Beside this, the wfs-freshness allows Corrupt queries in previous and concurrent operations to any user in U who does not have an oracle in G whereas the sfs-freshness allows, additionally, RevealState queries in previous and concurrent operations to all oracles that do not belong to G.
The notion of α-fresh sessions becomes important in security proofs in order to distinguish between "honest" and "corrupted" sessions. Intuitively, the above definitions are to be used as follows. In each of the secrecy cases considered, either the adversary is not allowed to ask some "bad" queries, more precisely such queries are allowed but immediately make the oracle unfresh. The scenario aims to delimit the "bad" queries. To properly manage the adversarial capabilities for each scenario of freshness, we distinguish between the following corruption models.
Definition 3 (Corruption Model β). A PPT adversary
A concrete proof of AKE-security needs to specify capabilities of the adversary depending on the intended freshness type. Combining definitions for freshness and corruption we obtain a set of reasonable adversarial settings (α, β) ∈ {(∅, wcm), (wfs, wcm-fs), (wbs, wcm-bs), (sbs, scm), (sfs, scm)}. Note that other imaginable settings are not reasonable from the perspective of the attacks. Nevetheless, separation in five types of freshness and four types of corruption models allows to talk about the corruption model in a general way, that is not necessarily in the context of AKE-security (but also wrt. other security requirements).
Remark 1.
In practice long-lived keys are mostly used to achieve authentication rather than for the actual group key computation. It is thus intuitively clear that if an adversary is able to corrupt a group member (obtaining its long-lived key) then it can impersonate that member in subsequent sessions. Therefore, achieving AKE-security in the (sbs, scm) sense would require the long-lived keys to be fresh for each new execution, a contradiction with the long-lived key terminology. To the contrary, the adversarial setting (wbs, wcm-bs) appears of great interest since it concerns only oracle internal state information and is independent of any long-term secrets. Moreover we argue that (wbs, wcm-bs) is important since in previous models [13, 32] a persistent internal state is used in both past and future sessions, and thus, while forward secrecy looks at (state) corruptions in later sessions, backward secrecy must legitimately look at state corruptions in previous sessions.
Security Goals
In this section we describe security goals for a GKE protocol. We give a formal definition of (Authenticated)KeyExchangesecurity (indistinguishability of session group keys), and a new definition of MA-security that considers malicious participants and internal state corruptions of honest participants.
Definition 4 ((A)KE-Security). Let P be a correct GKE protocol and b a uniformly chosen bit. Consider a reasonable adversarial setting (α, β) and an (active) adversary A. We define game Game (a)ke−b α,β,P (A, κ) as follows: -after initialization A interacts with instance oracles using queries; -if A asks a Test query to an α-fresh oracle Π s U which has accepted, it receives either
κ (if b = 0); -A continues interacting with instance oracles; -when A terminates, it outputs a bit trying to guess which case it was dealing with.
The output of A is the output of the game. The advantage function (over all adversaries running within time κ) in winning the game is defined as We emphasize that at this step we do not consider malicious participants (users), but only (partially) corrupted oracles for dealing with forward-and backward-secrecy.
The following definition of MA-security considers an adversary who is allowed to corrupt and act on behalf of participants during the protocol execution.
Definition 5 (MA-Security). Let P be a correct GKE protocol and Game ma P (A, κ) the interaction between the instance oracles and an active adversary A which can query Send, Setup, RevealKey, RevealState, and Corrupt. We say that A wins if at some point during the interaction there exist an uncorrupted user U i whose instance oracle Π The maximum probability of this event (over all adversaries running within time κ) is denoted Succ ma P (κ). We say that a GKE protocol P is MA-secure (MAGKE) if this probability is a negligible function of κ.
Note that U i and U j must be uncorrupted, however, A is allowed to reveal internal states of their oracles. Hence, our MA-security definition seems to be stronger than definitions of security against insider attacks in the KS model.
Note also that we do not deal with α-fresh sessions since malicious participants learn established keys implicitly. Also in Game ma P (A, κ) the adversarial Test query is useless. In the next section we show how this definition subsumes informal requirements of unknown key-share resilience, key confirmation, and mutual authentication (note that this is missing for the definitions in [32] ).
Claims Concerning MA-Security
In the following we present some claims to illustrate the relationship between our definitions of MA-security and the related mostly important informal notions concerning key confirmation, mutual authentication and unknown key-share resilience, since this relationship may be difficult to see at first sight. The informal definition of key confirmation [39] refined wrt. to the arguments in [43] means that each protocol participant must be assured that all other protocol participant that have accepted hold identical group keys. The notion of mutual authentication introduced in [8] for two-party protocols when considered for group key exchange protocols means that each identified protocol participant is known to actually possess the established group key. Note that this requirement is similar to explicit key authentication [39] . The related requirement called unknown key-share resilience surfaced in [24] means that an active adversary must not be able to make one protocol participant believe that the key is shared with one party when it is in fact shared with another party. Note that the adversary may be a malicious participant and does not need necessarily to learn the established key [10] .
The missing formalism of the original informal definitions allows only argumentative proofs for our claims. We also stress that none of the previously proposed models provides such claims for their definitions.
Claim. If P is a MAGKE protocol then it provides key confirmation and mutual authentication (explicit key authentication), i.e., every legitimate protocol participant is assured of the participation of every other participant, and all participants that have accepted hold identical session group keys.
Proof. If P does not provide key confirmation and mutual authentication then there exists at least one honest participant U i ∈ G whose oracle Π si i has accepted with a session group key k si i and there exists at least one another honest participant U j ∈ pid si i whose oracle Π sj j has accepted with a different session group key k sj j = k si i . According to Definition 5 this is a successful attack against the MA-security of P. This, however, contradicts to the assumption that P is a MAGKE protocol.
Claim. If P is a MAGKE protocol then it is resistant against unknown key-share attacks in the sense of [10, Sec. 5.1.2], i.e., the adversary A cannot make one protocol participant, say U j , believe that the session group key k is shared with A when it is in fact shared with a different participant U i .
Proof.
With respect to our model we assume that oracles Π sj j and Π si i participate in the protocol on behalf of U j and U i , respectively. If an unknown key-share attack occurs then Π sj j and Π si i accepted with the identical session group k, but since Π sj j believes that the key is shared with A we conclude that U i ∈ pid sj j must hold (otherwise after having accepted U j would believe that the key is shared with U i ) whereas U j ∈ pid 
Compiler for AKE-Security and MA-Security under Standard Assumptions

Security-Enhancing Compilers and their Goals
Imagine, there exists a black-box implementation of a GKE protocol which should be used by some group application. Assume this GKE implementation provides strong security properties but not all of them are in fact needed for the application. This means that some communication or computation resources are uselessly spent, resulting in a less efficient high-level application.
Assume, on the other hand, that the given GKE implementation does not satisfy all security requirements desired for the particular group application. Instead of designing and implementing a new GKE protocol in an adhoc fashion, it is desirable to have a generic technique which can be applied to the given black-box implementation in order to enhance its security.
We are thus concerned with the following question. What is a good strategy for the implementation of GKE protocols? Of course this depends on the relationship between the protocol and the application using it. Should the protocol be designed for a very specific application (and not likely to be re-used), it might be better to consider all stated requirements in the implementation and optimize the protocol accordingly. However, what to do if the GKE implementation should be flexible and easily modifiable, in order to be reused by various applications without any significant additional effort? Obviously, a good strategy (though not always optimal) is to implement a GKE protocol in a modular way: one starts with the basic implementation that satisfies the most common set of security requirements, then continues with the implementation of optional modules that can be added to provide extended security requirements. The main goal of security-enhancing GKE protocol compilers is to enable secure construction of GKE protocols in such a modular way.
Definition 6 (Security-Enhancing GKE Protocol Compiler C).
A security-enhancing GKE compiler C is a procedure which takes as input a GKE protocol P and outputs a compiled GKE protocol C P with additional security properties possibly missing in P.
Discussion on Existing Compilers for GKE Protocols
In the following we provide some analysis on currently known security-enhancing compilers for GKE protocols.
Each compiler description holds in the perspective of one particular operation execution (session). Therefore, by Π s i ∈ G we consider the i-th oracle in G assuming that there exists an index j ∈ [1, N ] such that U j owns Π s i . Similar, by sk i and pk i (resp., sk i and pk i ) we denote the private and public keys of U j used in the compiled protocol (resp., in the underlying protocol).
Compiler for AKE-Security The requirement on KE-security, i.e., key indistinguishability with respect to passive adversaries states the basic security requirement for any GKE protocol. To the contrary, the requirement of AKEsecurity may be optional. For example, if a network or a high-level application provides authentication implicitly then it is sufficient to use a KE-secure protocol. Therefore, it is reasonable to specify AKE-security as an additional property and design a compiler which adds AKE-security to any KE-secure protocol. Katz and Yung proposed in [33] the following compiler which provides AKE-security. It uses a EUF-CMA digital signature scheme Σ (see Appendix A for details). [33] )). Let P be a GKE protocol and Σ := (Gen, Sign, Verify) a digital signature scheme. A compiler for AKE-security consists of an initialization algorithm and a modified protocol execution defined as follows:
Definition 7 (Compiler for AKE-Security by Katz and Yung
Initialization: In the initialization phase each U i ∈ U generates own private/public key pair (sk i , pk i ) using Σ.Gen(1 κ ). This is in addition to any key pair (sk i , pk i ) used in P. The protocol: This is an interactive protocol between the partnered oracles Π Missing Generality of Katz-Yung Compiler Katz and Yung proved security of this compiler assuming an unreliable asynchronous broadcast channel and a passive adversary, which is only an eavesdropper. We show that in this case their compiler is not really generic: there exist GKE protocols that are secure against eavesdroppers but become insecure against active adversaries (even after the execution of the above compiler).
We consider the following (pathologic, but illustrative) protocol between Π However, if an oracle does not receive data in time, it accepts with g. If the passive adversary is just an eavesdropper, messages are delivered on time, and the protocol is "passively" secure. But an active adversary can drop messages so that both participants accept with g. Obviously, it is insufficient to restrict passive adversaries to be just eavesdroppers. Passive attacks should also model the unreliability of the communication, like we do.
Further, the compiler in [33] assumes that each sent message is of the form U i |t|m where t is a sequence number which starts with 0 and is incremented each time an oracle Π s i sends a new message. Before any received message is processed by the original protocol P the compiler checks whether this message is expected or not with respect to the next expected sequence number. Note that Katz and Yung introduced sequence numbers in order to simplify the description of their proofs. In our setting we can easily omit sequence numbers since any protocol which is KE-secure in our setting resists attacks based on modification of the delivery order of the protocol messages. Note also that sequence numbers do not provide any additional security advantages for the protocol (e.g., they do not protect against replay attacks). Another reason is that in order to check whether a message is expected or not the compiler must explicitly know the total number of messages required in the protocol execution. Thus, these numbers should be additionally given as input to the compiler. This additional effort must be applied for each GKE protocol to be used with the compiler. This can be considered as an additional inconvenience, especially if the protocol's implementation is available as a "black-box" that allows access only to the established group key.
Compilers for MA-Security The first compiler for key confirmation and mutual authentication was proposed by Bresson et al. [15] . However, their definition of MA is (de facto) the old one, and the proof is conducted in the Random Oracle Model [8] .
Katz and Shin [32] showed how to turn an AKE-secure GKE protocol into a UC-secure GKE protocol that provides security against insider attacks (see Section 4) .
It requires a EUF-CMA digital signature scheme Σ, and a collision-resistant pseudo-random function f (see Appendix A for details). [32] ). Let P be a GKE protocol, Σ := (Gen, Sign, Verify) a digital signature scheme, F := f k k∈{0,1} κ a function ensemble with range {0, 1} λ , λ ∈ N and domain {0, 1} κ , and sid s i is a unique session id. A compiler for security against insider attacks consists of an initialization algorithm and a protocol defined as follows:
Definition 8 (Compiler for Security against Insider Attacks by Katz and Shin
Initialization: each U i ∈ U generates his own additional private/public key pair (sk i , pk i ) using Σ.Gen(1 κ ).
The
Working in the UC framework, Katz and Shin assume that session ids are unique and specified by some highlevel application (see [4] for setting up session ids in the UC framework). In this case the above compiler can be proven to satisfy our MA-security requirement. On the other hand, if such unique session ids are not available then it is obvious that some additional communication rounds are needed to set up such session ids. Intuitively, leaving out session ids would allows replay attacks against the compiled protocol as illustrated in the following.
Imagine, the adversary A corrupts n − 2 participants (except for U i and U j ) in some previous session and behaves honestly in another session. Thus, he learns the keyk 
Compiler C-AMA
In the following we describe a compiler (denoted C-AMA) which provides both AKE-and MA-security for any GKE protocol P which satisfies the basic requirement of (unauthenticated) KE-security wrt. to our security model, i.e., where the passive adversary is given access to the query Send but is restricted not to modify, replay, or introduce protocol messages. C-AMA combines KY and KS compilers whereby slight modifications are applied (as mentioned in the previous chapter).
C-AMA uses digital signatures and collision-resistant pseudo-random functions (see Appendix A for details) and can be proven secure in the standard model. C-AMA uses nonces to achieve uniqueness of protocol sessions and security of concurrent executions without relying on session ids given by high-level applications.
Definition 9 (Compiler for AKE-and MA-Security C-AMA). Let P be a GKE protocol, Σ := (Gen, Sign, Verify) a digital signature scheme, F := f k k∈{0,1} κ a function ensemble with range {0, 1} λ , λ ∈ N and domain {0, 1} κ . A compiler for AKE-security and MA-security, denoted C-AMA, consists of an algorithm INIT and a protocol AMA defined as follows:
INIT: each U i ∈ U generates own private/public key pair (sk i , pk i ) using Σ.Gen(1 κ ). AMA: prior to the execution of P: -Each Π s i chooses a AMA nonce r i ∈ R {0, 1} κ and sends U i |r i to its partners. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS. C-AMA requires two further rounds: one to exchange random nonces and another one to exchange signatures on AMA tokens. As for the computation costs, every participant generates one signature for every message sent during P and one additional signature on the computed AMA token. Furthermore, every participant must verify one signature for every incoming message in P and n − 1 signatures during the additional confirmation round. The computation of the AMA token µ and of the session key K can be seen as negligible.
SECURITY ANALYSIS. Our first theorem shows that C-AMA adds AKE-security to any KE-secure GKE protocol. Following Remark 1, we do not consider the adversarial setting (sbs, scm). Well-known definitions of EUF-CMAsecurity for Σ as well as pseudo-randomness and collision-resistance for F can be found in Appendix A.
Theorem 1 (AKE-Security of C-AMA P ). Let (α, β) ∈ {(∅, wcm), (wbs, wcm-bs), (wfs, wcm-fs), (sfs, scm)} be an adversarial setting, let P be a GKE-α protocol, and A an active adversary in the corruption model β launching at most q s sessions of C-AMA P . If Σ is EUF-CMA and F is pseudo-random then C-AMA P is AGKE-α, and
Proof. In our proofs we use a well-known proving technique called sequence of games [44] which allows to reduce complexity of "reductionist" security proofs for complex cryptographic protocols, and became meanwhile standard for security proofs of group key exchange protocols, e.g., [1, 13, 14, 26, 27, 34] . We define a sequence of games G i , i = 0, . . . , 6 and corresponding events Win Game G 1 :This game is identical to G 0 with the only exception that the simulation fails and bit b is set at random if A asks a Send query on some U i |m|σ (or U i |σ) such that σ is a valid signature that has not been previously output by an oracle Π s i before querying Corrupt(U i ). In other words the simulation fails if A outputs a successful forgery. In order to estimate Pr[Forge] we show that using A we can construct a EUF-CMA forger F against the signature scheme Σ as follows. F is given a public key pk and has access to the corresponding signing oracle. During the initialization of C-A P , F chooses uniformly at random a user U i * ∈ U and defines pk i * := pk. All other key pairs, i.e., (sk i , pk i ) for every U i =i * ∈ U are generated honestly using Σ.Gen(1 κ ). F generates also all key pairs (sk i , pk i ) with U i ∈ U if any are needed for the original execution of P. The forger simulates all queries of A in a natural way by executing C-A P , and by obtaining the necessary signatures with respect to pk i * from its signing oracle. This is a perfect simulation for A since by assumption no Corrupt(U i * ) may occur (otherwise F would not be able to answer it). Assuming Forge occurs, A outputs a new valid message/signature pair with respect to some pk i ; since i * was randomly chosen and the simulation is perfect, Pr[i = i * ] = 1/N . In that case F outputs this pair as its forgery. Its success probability is given by Pr[Forge]/N . This implies
Game 
Game G 4 :In this game we consider the simulator S as a passive adversary against the KE-security of P that participates in Game ke−1 α,β,P (S, κ), i.e., the Test query of S to an accepted α-fresh oracle Π s i in P is answered with the real session group key k s i . In the following we show how S answers the queries of A. We focus on the construction w.r.t. the adversarial settings (wfs, wcm-fs) and (sfs, scm) and describe a simpler construction for the settings (∅, wcm) and (wbs, wcm-bs) at the end of the proof. Note that in case of (wfs, wcm-fs) and (sfs, scm) the active adversary A is given access to the Corrupt query and can actively participate in the protocol execution via Send queries in any session which is not α-fresh. Thus, if the guess of S is correct then no active participation of A in the q * s -th session is possible. Also none of the oracles participating in the q * s -th session can be asked for a RevealState query, and after these oracles have accepted none of them can be asked for a RevealKey query either. With these observations in mind we construct S as follows.
S corrupts every user U i ∈ U to obtain the long-lived key pair (sk i , pk i ) used in the original protocol P (if any such keys are defined). Then, S generates all key pairs (sk i , pk i ) honestly using Σ.Gen(1 κ ), and provides the active adversary A with the set of the public keys {pk i , pk i } Ui∈U . S initializes the list TList and runs A as a subroutine.
The idea of the reduction is that in all sessions except for the q * s -th session S executes the operation of C-AMA P itself, whereas in the q * s -th session S asks own Setup query to obtain a transcript T for the operation execution of P which it extends to a transcript T for the simulated operation execution of C-A P . An entry (sid, ⊥) is saved in TList for every session processed directly by S whereas (sid, T ) is saved for the q * s -th session. In both cases sid specifies the unique session id used in that session. We need also to consider that A can invoke the q * s -th session either via a Setup or an appropriate Send query. The queries of A are answered by S as follows.
Setup queries: If A invokes a protocol session via a Setup(S) query and the invoked session is not the q * s -th session then S executes C-AMA P itself and saves (sid, ⊥) in TList where sid is the unique session id built by A for that session. S can simulate the operation execution efficiently because it knows the long-lived keys of all users. If the invoked session is the q * s -th session then S forwards the received Setup(S) query as its own query and obtains a transcript T for the execution of P.Setup between the oracles Π s i in G which is composed of the ordered oracles in S. Then S extends T to a transcript T for the corresponding execution of C-AMA P .Setup by adding the initial messages of the form {U i |r i } 1≤i≤n . S also builds the corresponding q * s -th session id sid := r 1 | . . . |r n . Furthermore, for each successive message U i |m in T the simulator computes a signature σ i := Σ.Sign(sk i , m|sid|pid) and appends the modified message U i |m|σ i to T . Then S asks own Test query to any oracle activated via the Setup query in the q * s -th session and obtains (real) k which it then uses to compute the AMA token µ := f k (v 0 ). Then, S computes σ i := Σ.Sign(sk i , µ|sid|pid) and appends messages of the form {U i |σ i } 1≤i≤n to T . S saves (sid, T ) in TList and gives T to A.
Send queries: By Send 0 we define the query of the form Send(Π s i , S) which invokes a new operation execution for Π s i . Consequently the second Send query to the same oracle Π s i should include messages of the form U j |r j for each U j =i who holds an oracle in S. We denote such second query as Send 1 (Π s i , (U 1 |r 1 ) | . . . |(U n |r n )) whereby each U j that is part of (U j |r j ) is different from U i . Note that Π s i must have received a Send 0 query before in order to be able to answer the Send 1 query.
On any Send 0 query asked to an oracle Π s i the simulator chooses a random nonce r i ∈ {0, 1} κ and answers with U i |r i .
If a Send 1 query is asked to an oracle Π s i in a session which is different from q * s then S computes the session id sid s i using nonces from the received query while the nonce r i is already known after the previous Send 0 query, saves (sid . Such an entry must exist since TList contains such pairs for all session ids of the previously invoked sessions; otherwise the query cannot be valid due to the uniqueness of the session ids. If S executes the operation for Π s i itself then T * = ⊥ must hold. In this case S executes the next step of C-AMA P .Setup and replies accordingly. Otherwise, S finds the appropriate message U i |m|σ i in T * = T and gives it to A. Note that if T * = ⊥ then T * = T must hold whereby T corresponds to the "patched" transcript saved during the processing of the Send 1 query for the q * s -th session.
Corrupt queries: If A asks a query of the form Corrupt(U i ) then S replies with (sk i , sk i ). has not yet accepted in C-AMA P .Setup then an empty string is returned.
RevealKey queries: If A asks a query of the form RevealKey(Π 
When dealing with the adversarial settings (∅, wcm) and (wbs, wcm-bs) the above simulation can be simplified since no Corrupt queries need to be considered.
More precisely, when A asks for a Setup(S) query S first forwards it to obtain a transcript T of the execution of P.Setup. Next, S chooses random nonces r i ∈ R {0, 1} κ for every oracle Π s i in G which is composed of the ordered oracles in G, computes sid and specifies {U i |r i } 1≤i≤n as the initial messages in T . Then, for each successive message U i |m in T the passive adversary A computes a signature σ i := Σ.Sign(sk i , m|sid|pid) and appends the modified message U i |m|σ i to T . Then, S asks own Test query to obtain (real) k which it then uses to compute the AMA token µ and required digital signatures as described above. Finally, appends corresponding messages to T , saves (sid, T ) in TList and gives T to A.
Since in this case we are not dealing with Corrupt queries the simulator can answer all Send queries from the predefined transcripts. All other queries, i.e., RevealState (only in the setting (wbs, wcm-bs)), RevealKey, and Test asked by A are answered by S similar to the settings (wfs, wcm-fs) and (sfs, scm). Game G 5 :In this game we consider the simulator S as a passive adversary against the KE-security of P that participates in Game ke−0 α,β,P (S, κ), i.e., the Test query of S to an accepted α-fresh oracle Π s i in P is answered with a random bit string instead of the real key k 
Obviously, in this game A gains no advantage from the obtained information and cannot, therefore, guess b better than by a random choice, i.e.,
Pr[Win
Considering Equations 1 to 7 we get:
Pr[Game This results in the desired inequality Our next theorem shows that C-AMA also provides MA-security for any GKE protocol P. Note that our definition of MA-security allows malicious participants. Therefore, opposed to the BCPQ compiler, we are not concerned about the AKE-security of P.
Theorem 2 (MA-Security of C-AMA P ). Let P be a GKE protocol and A an active adversary launching at most q s sessions of C-AMA P . If Σ is EUF-CMA and F is collision-resistant then C-AMA P is MAGKE, and 
Note that this prevents attacks where Π s i during any session of the AMA protocol receives a replayed message of the form U j |m|σ j or U j |σ j where U j is uncorrupted andσ j is a signature computed by its oracle in some previous session. Note that Π s i does not accept unless it successfully verifies all required σ j for all U j ∈ pid s i in the AMA protocol of C-AMA. Having excluded forgeries and replay attacks we follow that for every user U j ∈ pid s i that is uncorrupted at the time Π 
Considering Equations 8 to 10 we get the desired inequality 
Conclusion
In this paper we found some problems with the definition of MA-security in the foundational BCPQ model. We proposed a revised definition which considers malicious participants and unifies many of the well-known informal notions. Additionally, we extended the (strong) forward secrecy in AKE-security by the symmetrically opposed notion of (strong) backward secrecy. Further we described the provably secure generic compiler C-AMA that adds AKE-and MA-security to any GKE protocol which is passively secure (wrt. to an adversary which can change the delivery order of messages, and delay or drop them). We refer to our parallel work in [16, 38] for further development, in particular, in the light of the contributory nature of GKE protocols and the appropriate generic solution for this security goal.
